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The Time of Our Lives is an intriguing book whose focus seems as elusive as the concept 
the author explores. On completing the book and therefore in retrospect, one realizes that 
Hoy offers clues for the wary reader. It is a critical history of temporality, and while one 
might naturally key on either history or temporality, by the end of the post script it 
becomes clear the author’s main interest is what he means by the word “critical.”  
 
As a history of temporality, it is far from exhaustive. Rather, Hoy selects the elements he 
considers significant and dodges the inevitable criticism of what is missing by building a 
tight thematic structure. It is, in effect, more of a critical timeline, with as many gaps as 
an Anglo Saxon chronicle; some authors and periods are as summarily noted as a 
chronicler recorded a less personally-significant year (“Ann. 845. Much rain”). 
 
Such a structure makes somewhat disingenuous the offer for readers to skip across 
chapters to trace out the thoughts on temporality of a particular philosophical player. 
While Hoy has done a superb job of caricature, the sketches (however deft) are still five 
minute charcoal versions of much more sophisticated and complex ideas. Again, the wary 
reader would realize that something else must be afoot, because Hoy is too careful and 
judicious in his writing not to notice himself the gaps and caricatures in what he has 
presented. 
 
At first blush, the thematic contents are specific and clear: Chapter 1 (“In Search of Lost  
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Time: Kant and Heidegger”) lays out fundamentals of the two main and arguably most 
formidable contributors to philosophical discussions about the nature and meaning of 
time. Chapter 2 (“There is No Time Like the Present! On the Now”) considers what 
major philosophers have written on the concept of present time.  Chapter 3 (“Where Does 
the Time Go? On the Past”) does the same for the concepts of past time.  Chapter 4 
(“‘The Times They Are a-Changin’: On the Future”) moves past Bob Dylan into what is 
understood by future time. Chapter 5 (“Le temps retrouvé: Time Reconciled”) lays out a 
series of four strategies for dealing with the idea of the passage of time. 
 
Hoy states boldly that “in this volume, the idea of time-consciousness itself is called into 
question right at the beginning. Whether it survives at the end or not, it undergoes 
conceptual transformations that might well make it unrecognizable to its most famous 
proponent, Edmund Husserl” (viii). When the main chapters conclude with a series of 
strategies, the reader is left wondering about both the link between such bold 
pronouncements and so diffuse an ending and why Hoy has presented such an 
abbreviated explication of what others have said about time and temporality.  
 
Given that this book – the first in a two volume set on the history of consciousness – is a 
history of “time consciousness,” Hoy posits the needs to consider the order that places 
“mind before time” (vii), challenging the conceptual foundations of the whole discussion 
about time and consciousness. Defining the difference between time (universal) and 
temporality (or experience of it, existence, or as Hoy calls it, “the life of our lives”), he 
sets up the polemic that all we have is temporality. 
 
Aligning himself with his friend and late colleague Richard Rorty, Hoy dismisses a 
Kantian position that holds the universality of philosophical questions, concepts and the 
ways in which they are addressed. Meaning change in concepts occurs over time; while 
he steps back from an Hegelian sweep through history, Hoy argues that thinking about 
things, here and now, involves a dimension of temporality necessarily discontinuous from 
what others might have thought about things, there and then. Thus, he says, we need to 
think more particularly about what is meant by temporality as “the time of our lives.” 
 
Meaning change, moreover, is not holistic and Hoy cites Foucault on the history of ethics 
to demonstrate that related concepts may change over time at different rates, further 
complicating the analysis of their relationship and meaning (227). 
 
It is not until the postscript on method, however, that Hoy really explains the book itself 
is an illustration of the method he espouses. Rather than arguing for the method up front 
and then providing illustration of what he means, Hoy first demonstrates the method and 
then – by the point the reader (however wary) gets the explanation – the illustrations are 
well-embedded in the thematic framework presented.  Diffident comments in the 
introduction, in retrospect, assume more significance after reading the post script – when 
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he says the “subsidiary thesis of this book is that the history of philosophy can make a 
philosophical difference” (viii), Hoy means it literally, as his method is intended to 
contribute to “transformation” that is potentially “techtonic” (viii). 
 
His method is genealogy, in preference to both phenomenology and critical theory. He 
offers a “tentative, working definition” of genealogy as “a philosophical method of 
analysis of how certain cognitive structures, moral categories, or social practices have 
come into being historically in ways that are contrary to the ordinary understanding of 
them” (223). Viewing post-structuralism as a chronological distinction as opposed to a 
philosophical school (“There was, however, never really any structuralist philosophy” 
(224)), he observes “the styles of the poststructuralist philosophers are so different from 
one another that they can just as easily be pitted against one another as allied under such 
a vacuous term as poststructuralism” (224). Unlike poststructuralism, he argues that in 
both continental and analytic traditions, genealogy has been adopted as the name for “a 
distinctive method” (224), one which though often attributed to Nietzsche, is also 
attributed by Nietzsche to “earlier British philosophers” (Hoy has argued elsewhere this 
included David Hume).   
 
Emerging further from his shell as the post script unfolds, Hoy becomes less diffident 
about his philosophical allegiances. He aligns critical theory and genealogy against 
traditional theory, explicating the necessity of a “standpoint” analysis, especially when it 
comes to morals, in order to avoid the problem of power relations co-opting philosophy 
in the service of social order. Both critical theory and genealogy are more historical, 
sharing “a similar attitude toward past, present and future” and claiming validity “only so 
long as they are useful” (229). Aimed “at social transformation,” critical theory and 
genealogy “both try to unmask power and show it for what it is” (231).  
 
These approaches do not necessarily result in social change, but Hoy says they make it 
more likely. More cautious in its conclusions than critical theory, “genealogy recognizes 
more cautiously that it does not change the world, but it does prepare the world for 
change. By disrupting the fatalism resulting from the inevitability of oppressive social 
institutions, genealogy frees us for social transformation, even if it does not tell us 
precisely what to do or where to go” (230). 
 
Hoy’s preference for genealogy (in the French poststructuralist vein) over Frankfurt 
School-style critical theory comes out of the some divergences, first in the philosophy of 
history and then in its appeal to real interests. Genealogy does not presume to posit any 
“bottom line for social criticism,” as theory “lacks the grounds for identifying some 
interests as true or real and others as false or illusory” (232). Thus, Hoy concludes, 
“genealogy strikes me as being more thoroughgoing than critical theory and 
Ideologiekritik in that it challenges the very idea of ideology. A suspicious genealogy 
cannot leave anything unexamined, including itself” (232). 
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Not afraid even at the end of his book to tackle large questions in a short span, Hoy 
synopsizes Habermas and Derrida in relating the method of genealogy to the problem of 
the existence of universals. Can this kind of genealogical approach ever have anything 
meaningful to say if it is suspicious of everything, even itself?  Hoy concludes 
“genealogy need not be opposed to universals. The problem is not universals per se. 
Though genealogy may be suspicious of claims to universality, it need not reject all 
appeals to universal structures or values” (234). 
 
Advocating a kind of “methodological nominalism” (235), he claims that genealogy “acts 
as if universals do not exist but with the caveat that they are not nothing” (235), 
concluding (as he reads Foucault) “genealogy is thus the study of the birth of universals 
and their transformation into principles of domination” (235), not “a form of universal 
history” but “a history of universals” (235-6).  
 
Taking the terms of Bernard Williams, he divides the genealogical method into two poles 
– vindicatory and unmasking – acknowledging at the end of the book that his critical 
history of temporality (with Hume) is more “vindicatory” of the ideas offered by the 
authors considered rather than the “unmasking” that Nietzsche preferred (242): “The 
project has been to examine everyday beliefs about temporality along with their 
philosophical interpretations, to deconstruct them or turn them in another direction, and 
to come up with another analysis than would result from the standpoint of the 
metaphysics of universal time” (242). If “the time of our lives” is existential time, 
however tentative and partial, it is the only sense in which we have access to time. Other 
more universal and objective assertions about time are undermined by a genealogical 
approach that casts suspicion on the terms, the method and any conclusions.   
 
By placing these things in his post script, however many clues and hints were to be found 
elsewhere, Hoy misses the chance to step up and “boldly go.” As an editor, had I received 
this in manuscript, I would have done my best to persuade him to reverse the structure 
and use the thematic contents to demonstrate the validity of his assessment of how 
genealogy has real, present value as a critical approach to the philosophical and practical 
problems of our generation. 
 
The book itself is sparsely and elegantly written. Each word and phrase is in its place and 
the care with which each comment is offered demonstrates a level of craftsmanship that 
makes the book a pleasure to read. Having set the stage for the second volume, however, 
David Couzens Hoy can be assured that his readers will be expecting a move from 
merely vindicatory genealogy to a real unmasking of the assumptions about self-
consciousness that underpin the social and political ills of our society. Whether it is self-
absorption, self-consciousness or the primacy of self, who we are and how we conceive 
ourselves – especially since the turn to autobiography in the eighteenth century – has 
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created the conditions of global culture that both imperil and shape the future history not 
only of the human race but the planet itself. The history of philosophy – however critical 
or genealogical the method – requires more than a vindication of what has been said 
before if it is truly to contribute to making social change possible, especially the 
“techtonic” nature of the changes required for a sustainable society.  
 
To use Shakespeare’s words, “what’s past is prologue” is more than a comment on time-
consciousness in a tempestuous age. Hoy hints at the ethical moment in this book. The 
next one needs to do more than vindicate notions of self, whether past or present. To 
really make his case for the present value of the history of philosophy, in volume two, he 
needs to say more about who then we should become – not just vindicating “the time of 
our lives,” but unmasking what we should do with it.  
 
I look forward to reading volume two! 
